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Note
RICHMOND MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN v. HERRING:
PROHIBITING PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION BUT KEEPING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INTACT
KATHLEEN MORRIS*
In Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring (Richmond
Medical Center V),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that Virginia‘s ban on partial birth abortion did not impose an
undue burden on a woman‘s right to obtain an abortion and was thus
2
constitutional. The Virginia Partial Birth Infanticide Act3 specifically
prohibits only the intact dilation and evacuation procedure.4 It further
includes intent requirements and a life exception, which allow a physician
to avoid liability in rare cases where an intended standard dilation and
evacuation procedure inadvertently results in an intact partial delivery of the
fetus.5 The facial challenge of the Virginia Act was based on a speculative
set of circumstances, insufficient to render the statute invalid.6
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit properly upheld the Virginia Act.
I.

THE CASE

In 2003, the Virginia Legislature enacted the Partial Birth Infanticide
Act (―Virginia Act‖).7 The Virginia Act criminalizes partial birth
infanticide (―partial birth abortion‖),8 where a deliberate act is intended to
Copyright © 2010 by Kathleen Morris.
* Kathleen Morris is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author extends special thanks to
Howard Gumnitzky, Notes and Comments Editor, Kerstin Miller, Senior Online Articles Editor,
and Professor Jana Singer for their patience, guidance, and insight throughout the writing process.
She would also like to thank her parents for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 169.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2009).
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1; Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks (Richmond Med.
Ctr. II), 409 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated, 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
8. The vast majority of abortions in the United States are performed during the first
trimester. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134 (2007). After the second trimester, the most
common procedure is standard dilation and evacuation (―standard D & E‖), where the cervix is
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and does kill a fetus ―who has been born alive.‖9 The statute defines a fetus
―who has been born alive‖ as one who is extracted from the body of its
mother to certain proscribed anatomical landmarks,10 and shows signs of
life including ―breath . . . beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical
cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the
umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached.‖11 Under the
Virginia Act, an individual who knowingly performs a partial birth abortion
is guilty of a Class 4 felony, with a possible fine of up to $100,000 and a
prison sentence of up to ten years.12
In Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Hicks (Richmond Medical
13
Center I), William Fitzhugh, M.D., filed suit prior to the Virginia Act‘s
July 1, 2003, effective date, challenging the constitutionality of the Virginia
Act on its face and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.14 Dr. Fitzhugh
challenged the law on the basis that he practiced obstetrics and gynecology
in Virginia, and in his practice he routinely performed abortions and
assisted patients suffering incomplete miscarriages.15 The District Court
held that the Virginia Act was unconstitutional because it (1) failed to
include a health exception,16 (2) impermissibly burdened a woman‘s right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy,17 (3) included a life exception that
improperly required a physician to choose between the fetus‘s life and the
health of the mother by forcing ―riskier‖ abortion methods,18 (4) was so
broad that it banned certain safe gynecological procedures without having a

dilated and the fetus is removed in parts. Id. at 134–36; Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks
(Richmond Med. Ctr. I), 301 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 (E.D. Va. 2004), aff’d, Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Hicks (Richmond Med. Ctr. II), 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated, 550 U.S. 901
(2007). A related procedure, accounting for less than four percent of second trimester abortions,
is intact dilation and evacuation (―intact D & E‖), which involves greater cervical dilation and
intact delivery of the fetus to a point where the physician can compress its skull with forceps, or
pierce the skull so that the brain matter may be suctioned out. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 137–40;
Richmond Med. Ctr. I, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 506. The Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center
for Women v. Herring noted the relevance of the medical evidence and descriptions of procedures
in Gonzales v. Carhart, where Dr. William Fitzhugh was also a plaintiff. Richmond Med. Ctr. V,
570 F.3d at 174.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1.
10. Id. In a head first delivery, the landmark is when the infant‘s entire head is expelled from
the mother; in a breech delivery, the landmark is when the torso past the navel is expelled. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10.
13. 301 F. Supp. 2d 499.
14. Id. at 502–03, 512–13, 518.
15. Id. at 502–03.
16. Id. at 513.
17. Id. at 515.
18. Id.
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requisite compelling state interest to do so,19 and (5) was too vague to
provide sufficient notice of prohibited conduct.20
On appeal in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Hicks
(Richmond Medical Center II),21 a divided bench of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court decision, with the majority and dissent differing
on whether Supreme Court precedent requires all partial birth abortion bans
to include a health exception.22 The majority held that the Virginia Act was
unconstitutional because it failed to include a sufficient exception for the
mother‘s health, as required by the Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart.23
Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion asserting that the majority
24
incorrectly construed Stenberg v. Carhart
as creating a per se
constitutional rule that any ban on partial birth abortion must include a
specified health exception.25 Judge Niemeyer asserted that the majority
failed to adhere to the proper standard for a facial constitutional challenge,
requiring the challenger to ―establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.‖26
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and, while
the appeal was pending, the Court decided Gonzales v. Carhart,27 holding
that a federal statute regulating partial birth abortion was constitutional.28
In Herring v. Richmond Medical Center for Women (Richmond Medical
Center III),29 the Supreme Court vacated Richmond Medical Center II‘s
holding that the Virginia Act was unconstitutional and remanded the case to
be reconsidered in light of Gonzales.30
In Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring (Richmond
Medical Center IV),31 the Fourth Circuit affirmed its prior decision that the
19. Id. at 516.
20. Id. at 516–17.
21. 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005).
22. Id. at 620, 629.
23. Id. at 625–26 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). In holding that the lack
of a health exception rendered the statute facially unconstitutional, the majority did not proceed to
consider the district court‘s subsequent reasons for finding the Virginia Act unconstitutional. Id.
at 629 n.2.
24. 530 U.S. 914.
25. Richmond Med. Ctr. II, 409 F.3d at 629–32 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
27. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
28. Id. at 127 (holding that a federal statute criminalizing partial birth abortion provided
sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and did not impose an undue burden on a woman‘s right to
an abortion).
29. 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
30. Id. at 901.
31. 527 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Virginia Act was unconstitutional, with the majority and dissent in direct
opposition regarding whether the omission of an intent requirement was
fatal to the Virginia Act.32 The majority reasoned that the Virginia Act‘s
failure to require intent or a distinct act33 was a crucial distinction from the
constitutional statute in Gonzales.34 The majority stated that the Virginia
Act functioned as an effective ban on the standard dilation and evacuation
procedure and thus unconstitutionally hindered a woman‘s right to choose
to terminate a pregnancy.35 The dissent argued that the lack of a health
exception was immaterial because the statute contained sufficient
exceptions to protect physicians against inadvertent liability.36
Furthermore, the dissent found that the majority‘s analysis of the facial
challenge was inconsistent with the holding of Gonzales, as Dr. Fitzhugh‘s
facial challenge was based only on hypothetical occurrences.37
After the Court in Richmond Medical Center for Women IV found the
Virginia Act to be unconstitutional even in light of Gonzales, the
Commonwealth moved for a rehearing en banc.38 The Fourth Circuit
reconsidered the case to determine whether the Virginia Act was
unconstitutional because of its allegedly insufficient health exception and
undue burden on a woman‘s right to choose abortion.39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Aborting unwanted or unhealthy pregnancies can be traced back to the
ancient Persian Empire,40 and while attitudes toward abortion have evolved
throughout history, societies have struggled to reconcile the conflicting

32. Id. at 131. The majority reasoned that the Virginia Act was an effective ban on standard
D & E because it penalized physicians who, although intending to perform a standard D & E,
inadvertently delivered the fetus and either performed an intact D & E or attempted to complete
the delivery. Id. at 148.
33. During a standard D & E, the suction and other physical maternal factors can cause the
fetus to become dismembered. Id. at 134. The majority reasoned that because the Act does not
require a separate, distinct act intended to kill or dismember the fetus, a doctor who intends to
perform a standard D & E but inadvertently delivers to a landmark could violate the Act if fetal
dismemberment occurs through no fault of his own. Id.
34. Id. at 148.
35. Id. at 137–39.
36. Id. at 155–59 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 163–66. The dissent stated that the Supreme Court had ―rejected any facial
challenge that was based on only ‗potential situation[s] that might develop.‘‖ Id. at 150 (citing
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007)).
38. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring (Richmond Med. Ctr. V), 570 F.3d 165, 168
(4th Cir. 2009).
39. Id. at 168–69.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973).
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lives and interests at stake.41 In the United States, many states adopted
42

laws banning abortion until 1973, when the Supreme Court stated that
while the State has an interest in the life of the fetus, the mother has a right
to choose abortion prior to fetal viability.43 The Court later refined this
analysis, stating that the rights of the State and the mother must coexist in a
shifting balance so that the mother is free to choose pre-viability abortion
without undue interference from the State.44 With the advent of newer
abortion procedures, such as standard dilation and evacuation and intact
dilation and evacuation, the Court continued to seek an appropriate balance
between the State‘s interest in the life of the now partially born fetus and
the mother‘s right to choose abortion.45
A. Early Abortion Laws Prohibited Abortions but Varied Penalties
Based on the “Quickening” Distinction
Early English common law prohibited abortion but based sanctions on
a distinction known as ―quickening,‖ the first cognizable movement of the
fetus in utero, usually occurring at about sixteen to eighteen weeks.46
Aborting a fetus prior to quickening was permitted, as the fetus was
considered part of the mother and not an independent being capable of
being a victim of homicide; aborting a fetus after the moment of
quickening, however, was prohibited.47 The quickening distinction carried
over into early American abortion laws.48 In 1828, New York passed a law
that became the model for other contemporary abortion legislation.49 The
New York statute prohibited all abortions, but maintained the quickening
distinction by making abortion of a pre-quickened fetus a misdemeanor and
abortion of a post-quickened fetus a felony.50 By the end of the 1950s,
nearly all states prohibited abortion, except to save the mother‘s life, and
the quickening distinction disappeared.51 In the 1960s and 1970s, however,
there was a trend toward liberalization, and approximately a third of the
states adopted some form of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code
41. Id. at 130–41.
42. See infra Part II.A.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. See infra Part II.D.
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132.
47. Id. at 132–33.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id. (describing the New York law (citation omitted)).
50. Id. It is also notable that the statute had a provision for ―therapeutic abortion‖ to save the
life of the mother. Id.
51. Id. at 139.
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Section 230.3, allowing abortion if the mother‘s health would be gravely
impaired by the continuation of the pregnancy.52
B. The Supreme Court of the United States Recognizes a Woman’s
Right to Choose Pre-Viability Abortion, as Well as the State’s
Interest in the Life of the Developing Fetus
In the United States, abortion law is defined by the need to balance the
sometimes conflicting rights of a woman and the State. In 1973, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Roe v. Wade,53 holding that
abortion invokes important interests of both the individual woman and the
State that must be balanced against one another with shifting weight as the
pregnancy progresses.54 Specifically, the Court identified the woman‘s
right to choose abortion, as found within the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
protection of personal liberty.55 The Court also recognized the State‘s
interests in protecting the life and health of the mother, the life of the
developing fetus, and the ethics of the medical profession.56 The Court
explained that while a woman‘s constitutional right to choose an abortion is
not absolute, a Texas statute prohibiting abortion except when necessary to
save the life of the mother was unconstitutional.57
As the woman‘s right to privacy, including the choice of whether to
abort a pregnancy, qualifies as a fundamental right, the State may regulate
abortion when its intervention is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
governmental interest.58 The Supreme Court held that in the abortion
context, the State‘s coexisting interests become compelling at different
times during the pregnancy.59 The Court adopted the trimester framework,
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3; Roe, 410 U.S. at 140.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Id. at 153–54.
55. Id. at 152–153; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court noted that other fundamental
rights within this personal liberty include child rearing and education, procreation, and family
relationships. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149–50, 153–54.
57. See id. at 154, 162 (―We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation. . . . [W]e do not agree that . . . Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant women that are at stake.‖).
58. Id. at 155. Although not explicitly enumerated, the Court has held that a right to privacy
is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to liberty. Id. at 152.
The protection is not unlimited, however, and the privacy right is considered fundamental only to
the extent that it deals with ―personal rights that can be deemed ‗fundamental‘ or ‗implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.‘‖ Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The
Court concluded that the decision of whether to terminate one‘s pregnancy falls within the
fundamental privacy right because of the tremendous impact the decision has on a woman‘s life.
Id. at 153.
59. Id. at 162–63.
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holding that the State‘s interest in protecting the health of the mother
becomes compelling at the commencement of the pregnancy‘s second
trimester,60 and the State‘s interest in the life of the fetus becomes
compelling at the point of viability.61 Although the State‘s interests are
present throughout the entire pregnancy, it is only when a particular interest
becomes compelling that the State may act.62 Accordingly, Roe stood for
the following propositions: (1) during the first trimester of pregnancy, the
State‘s interests were not strong enough to justify any regulation;63 (2) at
the end of the first trimester, the State may impose regulations that are
narrowly tailored to protect and promote the health of the mother;64 and (3)
when the fetus becomes viable at the beginning of the third trimester, the
State may act to protect its interest in the fetal life so long as it makes
exceptions for the life and health of the mother.65
C. The Supreme Court Refined the Framework and Emphasized that
the State’s Interests Coexist with the Mother’s Rights from the
Onset of the Pregnancy
The trimester framework outlined in Roe was eventually replaced with
a less rigid analysis evaluating the varying strengths of the maternal and
fetal rights throughout the pregnancy.
In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,66 the Supreme Court again considered
the various rights implicated by abortion and discarded Roe‘s trimester
framework in favor of a more flexible ―undue burden‖ standard to
determine the point when one set of rights must yield to the other.67
While still upholding the crux of Roe, the Casey Court noted that
many post-Roe decisions struck down nearly any State interference with
first trimester abortions, thus seriously undervaluing the State‘s interest in
the potential life at stake.68 The Court placed significant emphasis on the

60. Id. at 163. This determination was based on data showing that prior to that point,
abortions were as safe for the mother as natural childbirth. Id. at 149.
61. Id. at 163–64.
62. Id. at 155.
63. Id. at 163.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 163–64.
66. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania statute
imposing various regulations on abortions, including, among others, an informed consent
provision and a parental consent requirement for minors seeking an abortion. Id. at 844.
67. Id. at 869–79.
68. Id. at 875.
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State‘s rights, which are present from the outset of the pregnancy and
become stronger as the pregnancy progresses and develops.69
To remedy this practical incongruity, the Court rejected the strict
trimester framework of Roe,70 and instead adopted a more flexible system
where, prior to viability, a woman has a right to choose abortion without
undue burden from State interference.71 The Court noted that in light of the
State‘s substantial interest in the life of the developing fetus, the State is
justified in making certain regulations ―[e]ven in the earliest stages of
pregnancy.‖72 Such regulation will not be invalidated simply because it
makes the right to choose abortion more difficult or expensive; rather it is
unconstitutional only if it ―has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.‖73
The Court explained that the ―undue burden‖ standard was appropriate
because ―[a]s our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps
abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult
to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.‖74
D. The Court Strives to Continue Balancing the Coexisting Interests in
Light of New Abortion Methods
The balancing of rights was further complicated with the development
of new methods allowing abortions to be performed later into the
pregnancy. Particularly controversial methods were the standard dilation
and evacuation (―standard D & E‖) procedure and the intact dilation and

69. See id. at 869, 871 (―[I]t must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in
establishing not only the woman‘s liberty but also the State‘s important and legitimate interest in
potential life. That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgement and
implementation by the Court . . . .‖ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. Id. at 878–79. The Casey Court stated that the trimester framework was not part of Roe‘s
―essential holding‖ and described the system as an ―elaborate but rigid construct, [under which]
almost no regulation at all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy; regulations
designed to protect the woman‘s health, but not to further the State‘s interest in potential life, are
permitted during the second trimester; and during the third trimester, when the fetus is viable,
prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health of the mother is not at stake.‖ Id. at 872–73
(citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–66).
71. Id. at 872–74.
72. Id. at 872. The Court specifically addressed State action designed to educate the mother
about arguments for carrying the child to term, options available to her such as public assistance
and adoption, and the lasting mental and emotional impact of abortion, as the Pennsylvania statute
at issue included such provisions. Id. The Court went on to state that ―the Constitution does not
forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal
childbirth.‖ Id. (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)).
73. Id. at 877.
74. Id. at 873.
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evacuation (―intact D & E‖) procedure.75 Both procedures can be
performed throughout the second trimester, both before and after
viability.76
1. Prohibiting Both the Standard and Intact Dilation and
Evacuation Procedures Unduly Burdens a Woman’s Right to
Choose Pre-Viability Abortion
The Supreme Court in Stenberg v. Carhart77 found that a Nebraska
statute banning partial birth abortion imposed an undue burden on a
woman‘s right to choose abortion in the second trimester, and was thus
unconstitutional.78 The Nebraska statute prohibited ―delivering into the
vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure that . . . does kill the unborn child,‖
unless the procedure is medically necessary to save the life of the mother.79
The Court held that the statute‘s definition of partial birth abortion was
broad enough to encompass both the intact and standard D & E
procedures.80 Because the statute could be interpreted to ban standard D &
E, the most common method of second trimester abortion, the Court held
that the statute imposed an undue burden on a woman‘s right to choose
abortion prior to viability.81
2. The Court Held that Prohibition of Intact Dilation and
Evacuation Alone Does Not Impose an Undue Burden on a
Woman’s Right
After Stenberg, the Court again considered a ban on partial birth
82
abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart, but held that the Partial-Birth Abortion

75. The intact D & E procedure is sometimes referred to as ―dilation and extraction,‖ the term
used by the American Medical Association and the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
927 (2000), but this Note refers to the procedure as ―intact dilation and evacuation‖ or ―intact D &
E,‖ as used in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 137 (2007), and Richmond Medical Center for
Women v. Herring (Richmond Med. Ctr. V), 570 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 2009).
76. See supra note 8.
77. 530 U.S. 914.
78. Id. at 921.
79. Id. at 922; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-326(9), 28-328(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
80. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938–40. Because the standard D & E procedure involves removing
the fetus from the mother in parts, the Court reasoned that this could fall within the scope of the
statute, as there was no definition of what constituted a ―substantial portion‖ of a fetus. Id.
81. Id. at 938. The Court also held that the statute was unconstitutional in its failure to
include a health exception. Id. The Court later held in Gonzales v. Carhart that a health
exception is not always mandatory. 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007).
82. 550 U.S. 124.
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Ban Act of 2003 (―Federal Act‖)83 did not impose an undue burden and was
thus constitutionally permissible.84 When Congress passed the Federal Act,
banning intentional performance of an intact D & E unless required to save
the life of the mother, it responded to the Court‘s decision in Stenberg by
tailoring the Act‘s definition of partial birth abortion to include only the
intact D & E procedure.85 The Federal Act defined partial birth abortion as
occurring when a doctor:
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
is outside the [mother‘s] body . . . or, in the case of breech
presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the [mother‘s] body . . . for the purpose of performing an overt
act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living
fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of
delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.86
The Gonzales Court explained that the Federal Act was not so broad as
to constitute an undue burden because it excluded the standard D & E
procedure from liability, and only prohibited the intact procedure.87
Furthermore, the ―relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct‖ and
―objective criteria,‖ including the requirement that the live fetus be
intentionally vaginally delivered to a proscribed anatomical landmark88 and
that the doctor perform an ―‗overt act, other than completion of delivery,‘‖
intended to kill the fetus,89 adequately protected doctors from unintentional
liability.90 Thus, the Court explained that unlike the statute in Stenberg, the
Federal Act did not impose an undue burden on a woman‘s right to choose
a second trimester pre-viability abortion because the Act did not prohibit
the standard D & E procedure.91
Additionally, the Court held that the Federal Act was a constitutionally
permissible and rationally related means to achieve Congress‘s legitimate
interests in protecting both the ―dignity of human life,‖92 as well as the
―‗integrity and ethics of the medical profession.‘‖93 As the Court
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 141–42; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 147–49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 148 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(B)).
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 157.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)).
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emphasized in Casey, the State has interests from the beginning of the
pregnancy, which must coexist with the right of a woman to choose previability abortion.94 Thus, ―[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does
not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar
certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for
life, including life of the unborn.‖95 The Court held that the ban on partial
birth abortion was a constitutional exercise of the governmental power to
draw boundaries for tolerable conduct and protect its important interests.96
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring (Richmond
Medical Center V),97 the Fourth Circuit reversed its previous decision and
held that the Virginia Act was constitutional both facially and as applied.98
Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer began by explaining that although
there was no dispositive Supreme Court precedent regarding the specific
burden borne by the individual asserting a facial constitutional challenge,99
the discrepancy between alternative standards is immaterial, as Dr.
Fitzhugh‘s challenge did not survive even the most relaxed standard set
forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.100
Under Casey, for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, the plaintiff must
show that the statute places a substantial burden on a woman‘s right to
choose abortion in a ―large fraction‖ of the applicable circumstances.101
Judge Niemeyer explained that because the factual record showed that only
very rarely does an intended standard D & E accidentally become an intact

94. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
95. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
96. Id.
97. 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
98. Id. at 169.
99. The majority discussed three particular standards for a successful facial constitutional
challenge. Id. at 173–74. The first standard (―Salerno standard‖) requires a plaintiff to establish
―‗that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.‘‖ Id. at 174 (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). The second standard (―Casey standard‖)
makes no mention of Salerno and requires only that a plaintiff show that the statute functions as a
―‗substantial obstacle to a woman‘s choice to undergo an abortion‘‖ in a ―‗large fraction of the
cases‘‖ where the Act applies. Id. at 173 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 895 (1992)). The third standard signals a return to the more stringent Salerno standard
and states that a facial challenge will fail so long as a statute has a ―‗plainly legitimate sweep.‘‖
Id. at 174 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190
(2008)).
100. Id. at 174 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833).
101. Id. at 173; Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.

170

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 69:159

D & E prohibited by the Virginia Act, the statute is not facially invalid.102
The court reiterated that in considering facial constitutional challenges, it is
not required to consider every potential situation that may arise during
partial birth abortion procedures, but rather must consider only the overall
majority of situations.103 Because Dr. Fitzhugh failed to show that the ban
placed abortion providers at risk of unintentionally violating the law in the
majority of situations, he failed to show that the Virginia Act was facially
unconstitutional.104
The majority then explained that the Virginia Act gave sufficient
notice of prohibited conduct because the prohibited act must be intended to
kill a fetus that has already been born alive.105 Although its scienter
language differed from that of the previously upheld Federal Act,106 the
majority reasoned that because the Virginia Act focused on the deliberate
act that intentionally kills a live-born infant who is partially or fully
separated from its mother, the Act adequately identified the criminalized
conduct.107 While the Virginia Act imposed liability for intact D & E
procedures regardless of the physician‘s initial intent, the Act was clear that
the prohibited conduct was the intentional killing of an infant after it had
been born alive.108 The majority explained that in the event that a live fetus
was only partially expelled from its mother‘s body and its head could not
fully emerge, the doctor would not be liable for the infant‘s death under the
Act‘s exception for the preservation of the mother‘s life.109 In the rare
instance where this situation would not be life threatening, the majority
reasoned that the State may legitimately balance its interest in preserving
the life of a newborn against the woman‘s right to abortion when her life is
102. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 174–75. The court further noted that even in the
instances when an intended standard D & E procedure results in an intact D & E, the physician is
not required to violate the Virginia Act by deliberately killing the fetus, but may simply remove it
intact. Id. at 175. Additionally, in circumstances when the skull becomes lodged in the cervix,
posing a threat to the mother‘s life, the physician may invoke the life exception and take necessary
action to save the mother‘s life. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
106. The Federal Act evaluated in Gonzales prohibited only those procedures where the
physician‘s initial intent was to perform an intact D & E, not those that accidentally resulted in an
intact D & E despite the intent to perform a standard D & E. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 142 (2007) (quoting the Federal Act).
107. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 176.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 178. The majority noted that while the infant‘s skull becomes lodged in the cervix
in only ten percent of standard D & E procedures, the situation is nearly always life-threatening
for the mother. Id. Thus, this situation would usually fit within the Act‘s life exception, which
allows a physician to act in a way that, ―in reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent
the death of the mother.‖ Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E) (2009).
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not in danger.110 After concluding that the Virginia Act was not facially
unconstitutional, the majority quickly disposed of the as-applied challenge
of the Virginia Act because Dr. Fitzhugh had failed to posit any sufficiently
concrete set of facts where the application of the Virginia Act was
unconstitutional.111
In his concurrence, Judge Wilkinson wrote mainly about the societal
and precedential significance of judicially condoning a procedure he finds
unconscionable. He first explained that under Gonzales, the Virginia Act
must be constitutional, regardless of its minor distinctions from the Federal
Act.112 The concurrence then took a different approach from that of the
majority opinion and discussed the implications of finding the intact D & E
procedure constitutional.113 Judge Wilkinson concluded by reasoning that
this case was not about the right to abortion in general, but about
maintaining a line of humanity and not condoning a procedure that involves
the killing of a partially born infant.114
Judge Michael authored the dissent, reasoning that the Virginia Act‘s
fundamental shortcoming was that it did not require a physician to intend at
the outset to perform an intact D & E.115 The dissent averred that unlike
the previously upheld Federal Act in Gonzales, this Act criminalized all
intact D & E procedures, including those that only inadvertently result in
the fetus emerging to a proscribed anatomical landmark.116 Judge Michael
explained that because a physician would be exposed to liability under the
Virginia Act any time he or she set out to perform a standard D & E, the
most common abortion method for second-trimester pregnancies, situations
involving potential liability would be extremely frequent, and thus the
statute was facially unconstitutional.117 The dissent asserted that the lack of

110. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 178.
111. Id. at 179–80. The majority viewed Dr. Fitzhugh‘s testimony that each case and patient
warrants different decisions for how the abortion procedure will be carried out as too speculative a
scenario for an as-applied constitutional challenge. Id. at 180.
112. Id. at 180 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 181–83. Judge Wilkinson stated that this case was not about abortion in the broader
context, but about the particular practice of partial birth abortion. Id. at 183. He further stated
that by using sterile language such as ―‗fetal demise‘‖ and ―‗disarticulation,‘‖ the dissent avoided
the reality of the procedure, which he described as ―dismembering a partly born child and
crushing its skull.‖ Id. at 182–83. He argued that such a total denial of protection for ―[a]
partially born child . . . among the weakest, most helpless beings in our midst‖ is utterly
unacceptable for a civilized society. Id.
114. Id. at 182–83.
115. Id. at 184 (Michael, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. This characterization of the frequency of the Virginia Act‘s relevance was in direct
contrast to the majority‘s assertion that the potential for liability arises only in the infrequent cases
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the intent requirement would make physicians unwilling to expose
themselves to liability by performing standard D & E procedures, for fear
that an intact D & E may result.118 Thus, the dissent found the Virginia Act
unconstitutional under Gonzales because it placed an impermissible burden
on a woman‘s right to have an abortion.119 The dissent further reasoned
that the Virginia Act was unconstitutional because it exposed a physician to
liability by failing to distinguish between the act of killing the fetus and acts
necessary to complete the delivery.120 Unconvinced by the majority‘s
description of ―affirmative defenses,‖ the dissent found that the life
exception was an insufficient shield from liability. 121 The dissent
concluded its analysis by reasoning that the Virginia Act was also
unconstitutional as-applied, by focusing on the impact on Dr. Fitzhugh.122
Based on this analysis, the dissent concluded that the Virginia Act should
be found unconstitutional both facially and as-applied because it presented
an unconstitutionally significant obstacle for a woman seeking a secondtrimester abortion.123
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit properly held that the Virginia Act was not unduly
burdensome on a woman‘s right to choose a late-term but pre-viability
124
abortion.
As established in American abortion jurisprudence, the State
may exercise regulatory power to protect its interests both in the life of a
where an intended standard D & E procedure accidentally becomes an intact D & E. See id. at
175 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 187 (Michael, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 192. The dissent noted that the Virginia Act defined an infant who had been born
alive as one who had emerged to one of the specified anatomical landmarks—not just those
infants who had been completely expelled from the mother‘s body. Id. Judge Michael explained
that this definition was significant because a physician attempting to complete the delivery of the
infant could unintentionally cause dismemberment, which is a ground for liability under the
Virginia Act. Id.
121. Id. at 193–94. The life exception stated that the doctor may complete the D & E
procedure to save the mother‘s life, but in doing so, must take all possible steps to preserve the life
of the fetus. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E) (2009). The dissent pointed out that the two
requirements are in direct opposition because in order to complete the procedure, the doctor must
compress the infant‘s skull. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 193–94.
122. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 197–98. The dissent pointed to Dr. Fitzhugh‘s
description of the number of annual standard D & E procedures that he performed that
accidentally became intact D & E procedures, finding this information to be sufficiently concrete
to show how the statute would have an unconstitutional impact on him. Id. In contrast, the
majority emphasized that Dr. Fitzhugh had failed to raise any specific circumstances where the
Act would be unconstitutional. Id. at 180 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 169 (majority opinion).
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developing fetus as well as the ethical integrity of the medical
profession,125 so long as the regulation does not constitute a substantial
obstacle to a woman‘s right to choose.126 The Virginia Act prohibits only
the infrequently used intact D & E procedure.127 The Act gives sufficient
notice of the prohibited conduct and ways to avoid liability, and therefore
does not constitute a chilling effect on physicians willing to perform
standard D & E procedures.128 Furthermore, the asserted facial challenge
of the Virginia Act was based on a set of circumstances too speculative to
render the statute unconstitutional.129 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
properly upheld the Virginia Act as constitutional.
A. The Majority Correctly Held the Virginia Act Was Not Unduly
Burdensome Because the Legislature Is Permitted to Draw Certain
Lines, and the Statute Specifically Prohibits Only the Intact
Dilation and Evacuation Procedure
Because the Virginia Act applies only to the intact D & E procedure
and does not hinder the commonly used standard D & E procedure, the
Fourth Circuit correctly held that the legislature is justified in setting such a
boundary. Like the Federal Act upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales
130
v. Carhart,
the Virginia Act ―proscribes a particular manner of ending
fetal life‖131 by delineating a clear and specific definition of partial birth
abortion that prohibits only the intact D & E procedure.132 This specificity

125. See supra Part II.D.2.
126. See supra text accompanying note 71.
127. See infra Part IV.A.
128. See infra Part IV.B.
129. See infra Part IV.C.
130. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
131. Id. at 134.
132. Id. at 153; see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring (Richmond Med. Ctr. V),
570 F.3d 165, 177 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the Virginia Act, although not identical to the
Federal Act, was specific to prohibit only the intact D & E procedure). It is notable that while the
Virginia Act included an exception to save the mother‘s life, it did not include a health exception.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E) (2009). Earlier decisions finding the Act unconstitutional
heavily emphasized the absence of an exception to protect the mother in situations where her
health, but not her life, was in danger. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks (Richmond
Med. Ctr. II), 409 F.3d 619, 622–26 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding the Virginia Act unconstitutional in
part because of its lack of a health exception); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks
(Richmond Med. Ctr. I), 301 F. Supp. 2d 499, 513–14 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding the Virginia Act to
be unconstitutional because it did not include a health exception). When the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Fourth Circuit‘s 2005 Richmond Medical Center II decision to be
reconsidered in light of Gonzales, which upheld a federal statute that lacked a health exception,
the Virginia Act‘s omission of a health exception was no longer sufficient grounds to hold the
statute unconstitutional. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161–67 (holding that the omission of a health
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is important because, as the Court held in Stenberg v. Carhart, ambiguity
where the statute could be construed to prohibit the standard D & E
procedure, the most common method of late-term pre-viability abortion,
would present an unconstitutional undue burden.134 The Virginia Act
defines a partial birth infanticide as a deliberate act that the physician
intends to kill an infant who has emerged from his mother either past the
navel or to the neck, depending on the fetal presentation, and which does
kill such an infant.135 In a standard D & E, the fetus is removed in parts
from the uterus and is thus not delivered to one of the landmarks; 136 the
Virginia Act‘s specification that the fetus must first reach one of the
anatomical landmarks and then be killed by a deliberate act excludes
physicians performing the standard D & E from accidental liability.137
In its prohibition of only the intact D & E procedure, the Virginia Act
does not impede a woman‘s right to elect to undergo a standard D & E, the
standard method used for abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy.138
While the vast majority of abortions are performed in the early stages of
pregnancy, approximately ninety-five percent of the relatively small
number of abortions performed after the first trimester are completed by a
standard D & E, and the remainder by intact D & E.139 The Virginia Act
prohibits only intact D & E procedures, and a woman is free to choose to
undergo the more common standard D & E.140

exception did not render the statute unconstitutional when congressional findings were that there
may not be situations where an intact D & E would be beneficial to the mother‘s health).
133. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
134. Id. at 939–40.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(A)–(D).
136. See supra Part I.
137. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 176–77.
138. Id. at 177.
139. Id. at 174; Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring (Richmond Med. Ctr. IV), 527 F.3d
128, 133 (4th Cir. 2008). These statistics, verified by the Gonzales Court, represent the general
abortion practice. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 174. Dr. Fitzhugh testified that in his
practice, he performed roughly 4000 first-trimester abortions and 225 second-trimester abortions
each year. Id. at 170. Of the second trimester procedures, only an estimated fifteen to twenty-five
percent were intact D & Es. Id.
140. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 169. The dissent asserts that because of the slight
chance that a doctor intending to perform a standard D & E will inadvertently deliver a fetus to an
anatomical landmark, he will risk liability for performing an intact D & E each time he performs
the standard D & E procedure. Id. at 195 (Michael, J., dissenting). This assertion is erroneous
because once the physician is faced with such an unintentional progression in the delivery, he can
avoid liability by completing the delivery or by taking the necessary steps to save the mother‘s life
if it is at risk. Id. at 178 (majority opinion). Accordingly, while it is true that intact D & Es are
prohibited regardless of whether the physician initially intended to perform a standard D & E or
not, the Act does not effectively prohibit the standard procedure by creating a high risk of liability
for doctors who continue to perform it. See infra Part IV.B.
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The Virginia legislature, in prohibiting only a narrow category of
conduct, permissibly exercised its authority to establish a boundary for its
constituents to delineate what conduct will be tolerated and what practices
are intolerable. The Court has previously upheld legislatively determined
boundaries where ―practices that extinguish life‖ seemed too close to
condemned actions.141 In this case, the legislature designated the specified
points where an infant is considered ―partially delivered‖ as the line where
killing an infant by intentionally compressing his skull is too similar to
killing a fully delivered infant.142 Accordingly, by enacting a statute that
focuses on the specific act to be criminalized, but does not impede the right
to lawful abortion, the Virginia legislature was justified in ―draw[ing] a
bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.‖143
B. The Majority Correctly Held that the Virginia Act Did Not Impose a
Chilling Effect, Which Would Be Unduly Burdensome, Because the
Intent Requirement Allows a Physician to Avoid Liability by
Choosing to Complete the Delivery
The Virginia Act, like the Federal Act upheld in Gonzales, requires
that the physician deliberately perform an act that is intended to, and does,
kill the fetus.144 The statutes differ on when the intent is required; the
Federal Act requires that the physician intend from the outset to deliver the
fetus to an anatomical landmark in order to perform the fatal act,145 while
the Virginia Act requires only that once the fetus has been delivered to an
anatomical landmark, the physician intend to perform the fatal act.146 As
the majority explained:
141. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007) (upholding a federal act
prohibiting partial birth abortion and explaining that protecting such conduct would ―further
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human
life‖); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997) (holding that a legislative ban on
assisted suicide was constitutional).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B) (2009).
143. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat.
1201, 1206 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (2006)) (stating Congress‘s conclusion that partial
birth abortion is so similar to killing a newborn infant that it is ―gruesome and inhumane‖ and
―promotes a complete disregard for infant human life that can only be countered by a prohibition
of the procedure‖).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 148.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1).
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B). The dissent placed great emphasis on this distinction,
asserting that because the Gonzales Court ―based its decision to uphold the federal statute‖ on the
intent at the outset requirement, the Virginia Act‘s lack of such requirement rendered it
unconstitutional. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring (Richmond Med. Ctr. V), 570 F.3d
165, 187 (4th Cir. 2009) (Michael, J., dissenting). The Court in Gonzales, however, did not place
such weight on intent at the outset, and stated that because ―scienter requirements alleviate
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[T]he Virginia Act‘s scienter requirement targets the ―deliberate
act‖ that kills ―a human infant who has been born alive.‖
Whether the fetus is intentionally . . . or accidentally vaginally
delivered [to an anatomical landmark] is of no consequence. The
Virginia Act‘s scienter is measured only after partial delivery of
the ―human infant who has been born alive‖ and not at the
commencement of the abortion procedure, as under [the Federal
Act].147
Under the Virginia Act, at the point when the fetus reaches a
proscribed landmark and is considered partially born, the physician faces a
choice: He may attempt to achieve a full live birth by completing the
delivery, thus avoiding liability, or he may complete the abortion by
performing an intact D & E,148 incurring liability under the Virginia Act.149
While the Virginia Act does not preclude liability simply because a
physician initially intended to perform a standard D & E, a physician who
accidentally delivers the fetus to a proscribed landmark is not forced to
violate the statute, but may avoid liability by attempting to complete the
delivery.
The Virginia Act‘s intent requirement allows a physician to avoid
liability even when an infant is accidentally delivered to a proscribed
landmark, so it does not create a chilling effect on a woman‘s ability to
undergo a standard D & E.150 The dissent, however, reasoned that because
attempting a live delivery at this stage of fetal development frequently
results in the death of the infant, a physician will be unable to avoid liability
even if he attempts to complete the delivery, and thus will be unwilling to
risk liability by undertaking a standard D & E.151 This assertion ignores the
importance of the Virginia Act‘s scienter requirement, which functions to
impose liability only for a ―deliberate act . . . intended to kill a human infant
who has been born alive [to a specified landmark].‖152 The dissent stated

vagueness concerns,‖ the intent requirements included in the Federal Act ―buttressed‖ the
conclusion that the Act was constitutional. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149.
147. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 176 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). The
exception to liability is when the physician inadvertently delivers the fetus to the proscribed
anatomical landmark, the infant‘s skull becomes lodged in the cervix, and the mother‘s life is in
danger. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E); Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 175. In this
circumstance, the physician may invoke the statute‘s life exception and perform an intact D & E to
save the life of the mother. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E); Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at
175.
148. As the fetus at this point would have already delivered to one of the specified points,
completing an intact D & E would entail the deliberate act to kill the fetus.
149. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 177–78.
150. Id. at 175.
151. Id. at 184, 190 (Michael, J., dissenting).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B) (emphasis added).
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that because a criminal defendant is deemed to have knowledge of
something that is substantially certain to result from his acts, the likelihood
that fetal disarticulation will occur during an attempted delivery would
render a physician liable.153 But the Act can also be read to require
purpose, which would exclude from liability unsuccessful completion of
delivery. As the Court has stated, ―[T]he elementary rule is that every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.‖154 Attempting to complete the delivery does not
constitute the requisite act intended to kill the infant, the crux of liability
under the Virginia Act; accordingly, a physician will not incur liability if
the infant perishes during the attempt to complete the delivery.155 The
Virginia Act, therefore, does not create a chilling effect on a woman‘s right
to obtain a standard D & E because a physician who sets out to perform a
standard D & E but accidentally delivers the infant to a proscribed landmark
may always avoid liability by attempting to complete the delivery.
C. The Majority Correctly Upheld the Virginia Act Because the Life
Exception Allows a Physician to Avoid Liability in an Accidental
Intact Dilation and Evacuation, and Plaintiff’s Challenge Was Too
Speculative to Render the Virginia Act Facially Unconstitutional
The majority correctly held that the asserted facial challenge was too
speculative and consequently insufficient to render the Virginia Act
unconstitutional under even the most lenient standard for facial challenges.
Although the record shows that an intact D & E is ―almost always a
conscious choice and almost never accidental,‖156 Dr. Fitzhugh‘s facial
challenge relied on the possibility that if an infant presented in breech
position and emerged to the point where its skull became lodged in the
mother‘s cervix during an attempted standard D & E procedure, he would
be unable to avoid liability.157 The Virginia Act‘s life exception allows a

153. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 194.
154. Id. at 177 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
155. Id. at 178.
156. Id. at 174 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 155 (2007)). The Court in Gonzales
explained that to achieve an intact delivery, doctors ordinarily must engage in serial dilation. See
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155 (noting that ―[i]n order for intact removal to occur on a regular basis,
Dr. Fitzhugh would have to dilate his patients with a second round of laminaria‖ and ―[t]his
evidence belies any claim that a standard D & E cannot be performed without intending or
foreseeing an intact D & E‖).
157. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 170–71.
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physician to avoid liability and thus the exceedingly rare posited situation is
insufficient to render the Virginia Act facially unconstitutional.158
To invalidate the Virginia Act under the most relaxed standard for a
facial challenge, the Act would have to impose liability for accidental intact
D & Es ―‗in a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant.‘‖159 The
record established that in Dr. Fitzhugh‘s practice, only fifteen to twentyfive percent of abortions were performed after the first trimester of
pregnancy,160 and the fetus accidentally emerges in breech position to its
skull in less than one-half of one percent of those abortions.161 At this
point, the mother‘s life is ordinarily in danger,162 triggering the life
exception and allowing the physician to act within reasonable medical
judgment to save the mother‘s life without incurring liability.163 Although
the dissent claimed that should the mother‘s life not be in danger, the
physician would have no option at all to avoid liability, this contention is
unfounded because the Virginia Act‘s intent requirement precludes liability
when the infant dies during the physician‘s attempt to complete the
delivery.164 It is extremely rare for a standard D & E to inadvertently result
in an intact breech delivery where the infant‘s skull becomes lodged in the
cervix.165 In such a rare circumstance, the Virginia Act‘s life exception
precludes liability for a physician acting to save the life of the mother;
accordingly, the Act is not an undue burden in a large fraction of cases, and
thus was properly held to overcome the plaintiff‘s facial challenge.166
The dissent‘s rejection of this construction of the Virginia Act‘s life
exception fails to consider it in light of the overarching context of American
abortion jurisprudence and the continual struggle to strike a proper balance
between the State‘s interest in the fetal life and the mother‘s right to
abortion.167 The dissent posited that if the life exception could be invoked
by a physician who could only save the mother‘s life by deliberately
158. The majority noted that because this situation is at best extremely unlikely, the mere
―possibility of this rare circumstance certainly does not justify rendering invalid the Virginia Act
for all other circumstances.‖ Id. at 179.
159. Id. at 174 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)).
160. See supra note 139. The record in Gonzales showed that of 1.3 million annual abortions
in the United States, only ten to fifteen percent occur after the first trimester. 550 U.S. at 134.
161. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 175.
162. The majority affirmed Dr. Fitzhugh‘s testimony that when the fetus emerges in a breech
position and the skull becomes lodged in the cervix, the mother‘s life is in danger. Id.
163. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(E) (2009).
164. See supra Part IV.B.
165. See supra text accompanying note 161.
166. See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
167. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 550 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (discussing the
importance of the proper balance between the interests of the State and those of the woman).
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causing fetal demise, the exception would ―cancel out‖ the purpose of the
Virginia Act itself.168 On the contrary, by including a life exception in the
Act, the legislature designated a specific situation where the balance shifts
in favor of the State‘s interest in the life of the fetus, while still respecting
the mother‘s rights, thus allowing the rights to coexist.169
Furthermore, assuming that a situation could arise where the infant‘s
skull became lodged in the cervix without endangering the mother‘s life,
the Virginia Act is still constitutional in a ―‗large fraction‘ of the cases‖
where it is relevant.170 Although the dissent reasoned that the Virginia Act
was facially unconstitutional because the risk of this chain of events is
always a possibility, the court is not bound to judge constitutionality against
every imaginable situation.171 The dissent circumvented the patent
infrequency of this situation by reframing the inquiry: Instead of
considering how often the situation will actually occur, the dissent focused
on when the risk of such occurrence existed.172 By focusing on the slight
risk in every case that a doctor could incur liability (albeit from his own
choices), Judge Michael erroneously concluded that the Act presented an
undue burden in every case and was facially unconstitutional.173 This
reasoning ignores the principle that simply because a certain set of
circumstances may conceivably arise, a court need not invalidate a
statute.174 The Supreme Court has stated, ―It is neither our obligation nor
within our traditional institutional role to resolve questions of
constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might
develop.‖175 Accordingly, because courts are not bound to consider every
possibility, however unlikely, the majority properly held that the Virginia
Act could survive the facial challenge because it is constitutional in a ―large
fraction‖ of the cases where the law is relevant.176

168. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 193–94 (Michael, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 178 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 175.
171. See infra text accompanying note 175.
172. Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 195 (Michael, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (―The record here establishes that the Virginia Act threatens criminal liability—
and thus imposes a burden—in every case that calls for a standard D & E. That is 100 percent of
those cases, more than sufficient to sustain a facial challenge.‖).
174. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17, 21 (1960)).
175. Id. (citing Raines, 362 U.S. at 21).
176. See supra notes 172–175 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring
(Richmond Medical Center V) correctly upheld the Virginia Act.177 The
Virginia Act was a permissible legislative boundary because it specifically
prohibited only the infrequently used intact D & E procedure.178
Furthermore, both the intent requirement and the life exception provide
sufficient avenues for physicians to avoid liability under the Act.179
Finally, the rare circumstance in which a physician could potentially be
unable to avoid liability is too speculative to render the statute facially
unconstitutional.180

177.
178.
179.
180.

Richmond Med. Ctr. V, 570 F.3d at 169 (majority opinion).
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B–C.
See supra Part IV.C.

